The alternative that has become attractive in the eyes of many since the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza is an additional significant withdrawal in the West Bank. It is attractive because it relieves both sides of the pitfalls and crises of negotiating, affords Israel what many of us cherish--to determine our own fate ourselves--and avoids concessions and compromises over sensitive issues like Jerusalem. The price we would pay for this option would of course be to forego international recognition and leave open wounds for the future, when negotiations are liable to take place under more difficult circumstances and Israel will be left with little by way of territorial leverage. The price the Palestinians would pay would be acquiescence in an entity made up of autonomous enclaves ("bantustans") instead of contiguous territory, and the strengthening of Hamas, which would argue that only violence, rather than compromise, can remove Israel from the territories.

Israel's early elections, set for the beginning of spring, considerably shorten the period of political stalemate that commenced with the withdrawal from Gaza. Elections in Israel and the PA offer the prospect of a new departure. Will this take the form of an additional attempt to waste time and maintain the status quo while establishing new facts on the ground? Or, despite PM Ariel Sharon's concerted denials, will he carry out an additional unilateral move? Or will internal and external pressures force the two sides back to the negotiating table?

The attitudes of the principal actors in the arena can be characterized as follows. Among those advocating negotiations, some are prepared to pay the price of an agreement while others seek to maintain negotiations solely in order to prove that an agreement is impossible. Of those on both sides who oppose negotiations, some are prepared to make concessions, while others oppose any concession at all. That such disparate actors find themselves in the same category does not of course mean that there is any real resemblance or proximity among them, but rather reflects the fact that in politics strange bedfellows can share the same conclusion.

The Labor party, particularly since the primary victory of Amir Peretz, calls for a return to the Oslo track. This approach was supposed to have brought us back in May 1999 to a permanent agreement, and it mandates achieving such an agreement as quickly as possible. Peretz's haste in declaring, in the same breath, that he will not divide Jerusalem and "is not Geneva", raises incredulity concerning his seriousness. Nevertheless it would appear to be correct to categorize him among the supporters of negotiations and those prepared to offer significant concessions in return for peace. Meretz-Yahad is committed to the Geneva initiative and is thereby in the vanguard of those advocating negotiations and concessions for peace. Of the Arab parties, Hadash also emphasizes such positions. The PA under Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) has long advocated renewing peace negotiations, and among its leaders are prominent personalities who have voiced explicit support for the Geneva initiative.

It would appear fair to state that the Likud (particularly in the event Netanyahu is its leader) emphasizes the priority of negotiations primarily because it sees in them a way of maintaining the status quo, insofar as it never evinces a readiness to make concessions that the other side can live with. There are also elements on the Palestinian left that offer negotiations with Israel not with the purpose of reaching an historic compromise but rather in order to prove just how impossible it is.

It was Ariel Sharon who stopped the peace negotiations in early 2001 and who has done everything in order not to return to them. He asserts that there is no peace agreement that both Israelis and Palestinians can accept. Hence conceivably, under certain circumstances, and particularly if he feels pressured, he will prefer to withdraw unilaterally from additional areas. Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beteinu party fills a similar ideological slot. On the Palestinian side, Hamas opposes any agreement with Israel because it is not prepared to legitimate the state of the Jews, but would agree to an extended ceasefire were Israel to withdraw unilaterally. From this standpoint it is the ultimate partner for the Kadima party.

Parties like the NRP and the National Union make no secret of their opposition to any negotiations and any territorial concession. Islamic Jihad presents a similar refusal.

It took more than 38 years for the Israeli political mainstream to understand that without significant concessions regarding the Land of Israel it cannot maintain a Jewish and democratic state here. We don't have another 38 years for the mainstream to recognize that there is no better way to reach that goal than an historic agreement between the two peoples--despite the hostility and despite the scars.-

Published 12/12/2005 © bitterlemons.org